This Thursday, I will be presenting new research in the seminar series of the Netherlands Institute of Advanced Studies.
My paper presents a historical case study of the investment politics of Dutch pension fund for public employees, ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds). Combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the research maps the financial flows between ABP and the broader political economy before and after WW2, while at the same time shedding light on the political considerations that informed the fund’s investment policies. I show how over time ABP’s investment politics became increasingly caught between the political interests of the state on the one hand and the dictates of dominant financial theories on the other hand.
The history of the ABP is indicative of the centrality of pension funds to the Dutch political economy. Contrary to traditional bank-based or stock-market based systems, the presence of these large funds have allowed the Netherlands to combine a generous welfare state with high financial development. Still, as the case study shows, the ongoing financialization of the welfare state has coincided with a depoliticization of pension investment. The result is a loss of public control over the flows of capital that emanate from the Dutch pension funds on the one hand and growing instability within the private pension system on the other hand.
This is unpublished work. Please e-mail, if interested in the paper.